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OFF THE CONSTITUTIONAL MAP: BREAKING THE 
ENDLESS CYCLE OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION 
School finance litigation has been caught in a never-ending 
cycle in the United States. At the root of the problem is 
legislative inaction and judicial withdrawal. A few courts have 
chosen to stay involved, however—even to the point of holding 
uncooperative legislatures in contempt or shutting down schools 
entirely. This Comment examines three states that have been 
hotbeds for this type of litigation and pushed the perceived 
boundaries of their constitutional powers. It advocates for a 
new approach for courts embroiled in a school funding 
battle. While this approach is unprecedented, this Comment 
argues it is both constitutional and effective. This is done by 
way of comparison to similar separation of powers battles, such 
as those during the prison reform and Civil Rights movements. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One function of the court system is to provide finality to the 
parties and to resolve, once and for all, the dispute at hand.1 
This doctrine saves the judiciary time and resources by 
ensuring the same issues are not rehashed again and again. It 
gives the parties a sense of resolution. It also promotes 
fairness, continuity, and predictability in the legal system. This 
doctrine manifests itself in multiple ways throughout the law: 
res judicata, claim preclusion, double jeopardy, and stare 
decisis, to name a few. 
School finance litigation is one area where finality has been 
incredibly elusive.2 Litigants in these suits seek to remedy the 
perceived inadequacies or inequalities in public school funding, 
 
 1 See James Duke Cameron, Federal Review, Finality of State Court Decisions, 
and a Proposal for a National Court of Appeals—A State Judge’s Solution to a 
Continuing Problem, 1981 BYU L. REV. 545, 556 (1981) (“Without finality, justice is a 
myth.”); Brandon R. Christian, If at First You Don’t Succeed: Understanding Judicial 
Doctrines of Finality, 85 FLA. BAR J. 32, 32 (2011), available at 
http://www.floridabar.org/divcom/jn/jnjournal01.nsf/Author/68F14BA4C5C82DD78525
78810069CAEE. 
 2 See infra Part II.B. 
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which has been a difficult problem to solve. While this difficulty 
is due to a complex number of problems, a major root of the 
problem is legislative inaction.3 This, in turn, has led some 
courts to relinquish their involvement in any new school 
finance cases.4 Ultimately, this means no one is fighting for 
children’s right to equal or adequate education in those states, 
which is a troublesome notion and sure to have negative effects 
years into the future. 
A few courts, however, have chosen to fight back—even to 
the point of holding the legislature in contempt for failing to 
comply with their orders, or shutting down schools entirely.5 
This Comment examines three states that have not only been 
hotbeds for this type of litigation, but whose courts have 
decided to deal with these suits by pushing the perceived 
boundaries of their constitutional powers. As these states 
realized, stern and novel judicial approaches, such as holding 
noncompliant branches in contempt, are an unfortunate 
necessity in these situations. 
This Comment advocates for a new approach for courts 
embroiled in a school funding battle. Part II provides a broad 
overview of school finance litigation in the United States. Part 
III then proceeds with a deeper look at three states in which 
courts have clashed with legislatures in highly politicized and 
controversial cases, and examines the separation of powers 
issues in each. Part IV explores the different remedial trends in 
school finance litigation and transitions into a recommendation 
of which may be the most effective. This recommendation is 
fully developed in Part V, which urges courts faced with 
legislative inaction not to shirk their constitutional duty, as 
many have now started to do. Courts can do this by imposing 
contempt or other sanctions on legislatures that refuse to 
cooperate. While this approach is relatively unprecedented, I 
argue that contempt sanctions in these situations are both 
constitutional and effective. This analysis is accomplished by 
 
 3 Laurie Reynolds, Full State Funding of Education as a State Constitutional 
Imperative, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 749, 749–52 (2009) (“[L]egislative responses often d[o] 
little to remedy the inequality . . . [P]laintiff victories rarely produce a systemic 
overhaul of the school funding formulas. In part, that may be because legislators have 
not always rushed to implement their court-imposed duty.”). 
 4 Id. at 761 (“Although a small number of state courts has [sic] long refused to 
become embroiled in school funding debates, a new round of ‘judicial withdrawal’ is 
emerging . . . .”). 
 5 See infra Part III.B–C. 
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way of comparison to similar separation of powers battles, such 
as those that took place during the Civil Rights movement. 
II. THE STATE OF SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION IN AMERICA 
More than half a century has passed since the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of Education, the 
seminal case on education inequality in America.6 It recognized 
and enforced the idea that “education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments.”7 Yet, many 
believed that inequality and inadequacy continued to exist in 
schools after this ruling, and not just on racial grounds.8 
Indeed, many continue to believe this problem still exists 
today.9 Courts have, at times, agreed, and applied the Brown 
ruling to other types of educational inequality cases since the 
1950s.10 This part will explore the broad historical background 
of school funding cases in the United States. 
A. What is School Finance Litigation? 
School finance lawsuits seek to redress this perceived 
inadequacy or inequality in the way states fund public schools 
or public school districts.11 Funding for local education comes 
from a variety of sources: the federal government, state 
governments, and local public and private donors.12 Because of 
this, the resources available to any given student can vary 
greatly from state to state and across the country.13 Due to 
reliance on local levies and property taxes, low-income districts 
who cannot afford the extra property taxes perpetually 
underfund their schools; higher-income districts can not only 
adequately support their schools, but use the extra money to 
offer an abundance of resources as well.14 Even the low-income 
districts that choose to tax themselves at or above the rates of 
 
 6 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 7 Id. at 493. 
 8 National Education Access Network, NAT’L EDUC. ACCESS NETWORK, 
http://schoolfunding.info/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2016). 
 9 Id. 
 10 1-5 EDUCATION LAW § 5.01 (1984) {hereinafter EDUCATION LAW]. 
 11 See Michael Griffin, School Finance Litigation and Beyond, EDUC. COMM’N OF 
THE STATES (April 2005), http://www.ecs.org/clearinghouse/60/26/6026.htm. 
 12 EDUCATION LAW, supra note 10, § 5.01. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Reynolds, supra note 3, at 752. 
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comparable wealthy districts do not produce as much funding 
for schools because of low property values.15 
B. Early School Finance Case Law 
School funding cases technically got their start in 1819,16 
with Commonwealth v. Inhabitants of Dedham.17 In that case, 
Massachusetts sued the people of Dedham when they did not 
comply with a state law requiring each town to employ a 
sufficiently qualified teacher for every twenty households.18 The 
town employed qualified teachers in some schools, but not all.19 
The court reasoned that this law was in place to “give all the 
inhabitants equal privileges, for the education of their children 
in the public schools,” and that “it is not competent for a town 
to establish a grammar school for the benefit of one part of the 
town, to the exclusion of the other; although the money raised 
for the support of schools may be, in other respects, fairly 
apportioned.”20 
While the state commenced the litigation process against its 
residents in Dedham, the party roles have reversed in the 
present day. Now, plaintiffs are typically students, parents, 
and school districts, while defendants tend to be the state. That 
was indeed what transpired in San Antonio Independent 
School District v. Rodriguez, the next significant case in the 
history of school finance litigation.21 The plaintiffs came from 
Texas school districts with large minority and low-income 
populations.22 The state school funding formula relied on local 
property taxes.23 This funding structure resulted in the 
plaintiffs’ lower-income district being able to spend $356 per 
student; they compared this with the highest-income district 
that spent $594 per student.24 The plaintiffs challenged the 
constitutional validity of this formula as it created unequal 
expenditures between children across different districts, 
 
 15 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 75 (1973). 
 16 Litigation, EDUC. JUST. (2014), 
http://www.educationjustice.org/litigation.html. 
 17 16 Mass. 141 (1819). 
 18 Id. at 144. 
 19 Id. at 145–46. 
 20 Id. at 146. 
 21 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
 22 Id. at 4–5. 
 23 Id. at 10–11. 
 24 Id. at 12–13. 
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resulting in a lower quality education for the low-income 
districts.25 
The district court agreed with the Rodriguez plaintiffs and 
found that the Equal Protection Clause mandated funding 
equality in their schools.26 The Supreme Court reversed and 
upheld the state’s funding formula.27 It found that the system 
did not discriminate against a “definable category of ‘poor’ 
people” and that it did not result in an absolute deprivation of 
education.28 Moreover, the Court determined that wealth is not 
a suspect classification and used rational basis review to reach 
its decision.29 According to the Court, holding otherwise would 
violate basic separation of powers principles by “assuming a 
legislative role . . . for which the Court lacks both authority and 
competence.”30 It refused to create positive constitutional rights 
for the sake of equal protection.31 Thus, in the eyes of the 
Powell Court, education is not a fundamental right under the 
federal Constitution.32 As Justice Marshall noted in his lengthy 
dissent, school finance litigants must now look to the states for 
remedies.33 This separation of powers dialogue that began in 
Rodriguez has continued at the state level and sparked a 
heated public debate between branches of government. 
C. Modern Theories in School Funding Litigation 
State equal protection contests in the same vein as 
Rodriguez have not been terribly successful.34 Much like the 
plaintiffs in Rodriguez, proponents of school finance reform 
claim that unequal distribution of funds across districts 
violates the equal protection clause under their state 
constitutions.35 School finance litigation was typically based on 
 
 25 Id. at 23. 
 26 Id. at 15–16. 
 27 Id. at 25. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Amanda Marra, Note, The Right to a Thorough and Efficient System of 
Education Trumps the Power of the Appropriations Clause in New Jersey, 43 RUTGERS 
L. J. 771, 778 (2013). 
 30 411 U.S. at 31 
 31 Id. at 33. 
 32 Id. at 35. 
 33 MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY 
THROUGH THE STATE COURTS 2 (2009). 
 34 Aaron Y. Tang, Note, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for 
School Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 1195, 1204 (2011). 
 35 Id. at 1202. 
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these equal protection arguments in the 1960s and 1970s.36 An 
estimated fourteen states have seen plaintiff victories under 
this theory.37 This may be because courts and parties struggle 
to define “equity” when it comes to school funding, and because 
some courts believe education is a purely legislative matter38—
another argument echoed from Rodriguez.39 One study 
concluded that states with school funding decisions based on 
the equity theory actually experience declines in educational 
funding.40 
A few plaintiffs have experienced victories under this 
approach, Wyoming being one example.41 There, the state 
requires that school funding be based exclusively on student 
need and the cost of services; fully funded at the state and not 
the local level; and completely independent of the property 
wealth of its district constituents.42 The impact of this victory is 
reflected in some studies. For example, the Education Law 
Center’s annual report card on school funding shows that 
Wyoming is one of only three states that pays its teachers as 
much or more than comparable workers (Rhode Island and 
New York are the other two states).43 The study also shows that 
Wyoming has the highest per-pupil spending of any state, at 
$17,397 per student—over two and half times what the lowest-
spending state spends on its pupils (Idaho, at $6,753 per 
student).44 
While equity arguments have led to limited success, 
challenges based on the education clause in state constitutions 
are a somewhat different story. As soon as litigants switched to 
“adequacy” arguments under these clauses, plaintiffs started 
seeing greater successes.45 All states have imposed upon 
 
 36 Ben Wieder, Texas Among 10 States Facing Lawsuits Over Education 
Funding, WASH. POST (Jan. 2, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2013/ 
01/02/4d9a7cca-544d-11e2-8b9e-dd8773594efc_story.html.  
 37 Tang, supra note 34, at 1202. 
 38 Id. at 1203–06. 
 39 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 31 (1973). 
 40 Michael Heise, State Constitutional Litigation, Educational Finance, and 
Legal Impact: An Empirical Analysis, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1735, 1761 (1995). 
 41 Reynolds, supra note 3, at 787. 
 42 Id. 
 43 BRUCE D. BAKER ET AL., EDUC. L. CTR., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL 
REPORT CARD 38 (3d ed. 2014), available at 
http://schoolfundingfairness.org/National_Report_Card_2014.pdf. 
 44 Id. at 11. 
 45 Tang, supra note 34, at 1206. 
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themselves positive constitutional duties to maintain 
education.46 All fifty state constitutions mandate a “common,” 
“uniform,” “efficient,” or some other standard of a public school 
system,47 and many even say that this is a democratic 
imperative.48 Two state constitutions make education the 
“paramount duty” of the state.49 Moreover, the most important 
source of funding for public education has commonly come from 
states.50 Adequacy suits argue that, under these state 
constitution education clauses, the legislature has failed to 
provide an adequate level of education for all students.51 One 
source estimates that twenty-two out of thirty-three, or sixty-
seven percent, of adequacy cases decided since 1989 have been 
victories for the plaintiffs.52 
Commentators suggest adequacy suits have likely been 
more successful than equity suits because they stem from a 
more definite part of a constitutional text and are not subject to 
the same difficulty in defining “equity” in the education finance 
concept.53 While adequacy arguments are sometimes made 
alongside equity arguments, adequacy claims differ in that 
they seek an absolute remedy instead of a relative one.54 
One state where this success has been realized is New 
Hampshire. Before fruitful school finance litigation took place 
there, schools relied heavily on local contributions. State 
contributions only totaled eight percent of funding at that 
time.55 Low-income districts spent as little as eight thousand 
dollars per student and higher-income districts spent more 
than twenty thousand dollars per student.56 The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court found that this funding formula 
violated the state constitution, because the state had a duty to 
provide an adequate education to all students under that 
 
 46 John Dayton & Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who’s Winning the 
War? 57 VAND. L. REV. 2351, 2356 n.13 (2004). 
 47 EDUCATION LAW, supra note 10. 
 48 Molly A. Hunter, State Constitution Education Clause Language, EDUC. L. 
CTR. (Jan. 2011), http://pabarcrc.org/pdf/Molly%20Hunter%20Article.pdf. 
 49 FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 50 EDUCATION LAW, supra note 10. 
 51 Tang, supra note 34, at 1206. 
 52 REBELL, supra note 33, at 15–29. 
 53 Tang, supra note 34, at 1202, 1207. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Reynolds, supra note 3, at 786. 
 56 Id. 
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document, and that “[t]here is nothing fair or just about taxing 
a home or other real estate in one town at four times the rate 
that similar property is taxed in another town to fulfill the 
same purpose of meeting the State’s educational duty.”57 The 
court continued, “in order to deliver a constitutionally adequate 
public education to all children, comparable funding must be 
assured . . . .”58 Obviously, an argument about the inequity 
resulting from a locally-based funding formula convinced the 
court that the whole formula was inadequate—local control 
was, to the court, an inadequate means of funding education, 
and the state was required to play a bigger role.59 
Since then, New Hampshire has been one of only three 
states to increase education funding—by more than twenty 
percent, no less—from 2007 to 2011, despite the troubled 
economy (Illinois and North Dakota are the other two).60 The 
Education Law Center, however, still gave the state an “F” 
rating for 2014 because of how fairly it distributes funds across 
districts, suggesting that spending more money does not 
necessarily mean all students are getting access to it.61 
Still, the adequacy arguments have been susceptible to the 
contention that education is a public policy matter better suited 
for the legislature than the courts. A majority of the courts that 
have rejected adequacy cases did so on the grounds of 
justiciability.62 One example is Illinois. The supreme court 
there rejected an education finance claim because it would 
“deprive the members of the general public of a voice in a 
matter which is close to the hearts of all individuals in 
Illinois.”63 
D. Challenges Still Remaining 
Despite the relative trend toward success in school finance 
litigation, students overall are seeing little in the way of 
 
 57 Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 703 A.2d 1353, 1357–60 (1997). 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. at 1353, 1360 (“We recognize that local control plays a valuable role in 
public education; however, the State cannot use local control as a justification for 
allowing the existence of educational services below the level of constitutional 
adequacy.”). 
 60 BAKER ET AL., supra note 43, at 11. 
 61 Id. at 18. 
 62 REBELL, supra note 33, at 22–29. 
 63 Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1191 (Ill. 1996). 
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positive change. Empirical analyses have shown that successful 
litigation does not necessarily influence education spending in 
states.64 In fact, one study found that successful litigation 
actually decreases educational spending.65 Despite proof that 
reliance on local revenues creates inadequacies and 
inequalities, and even despite court victories acknowledging 
this fact, local funding still accounts for 43.5 percent of 
revenues for elementary and secondary education in the United 
States.66 In addition, while the nation reached its highest-ever 
high school graduation rate in 2012—at eighty percent—the 
disparities between low-income and higher-income, minority 
and non-minority, and city and suburban students are still 
staggering.67 Also, the United States has fallen behind eleven 
other countries for college graduation rates, perhaps indicative 
of the long-term consequences of this problem.68 
The recession has not helped, either. School funding faces a 
big risk, and usually suffers during economic decline.69 School 
funding cases implicitly assume that more money in schools 
will cause educational successes to rise to an acceptable level.70 
While this is a contentious issue, courts are starting to 
understand the connection. As the Wyoming Supreme Court 
opined, “[i]t is nothing more than an illusion to believe that the 
extensive disparity in financial resources does not relate 
directly to quality of education.”71 Instructively, the United 
States Supreme Court also observed that “[i]t would be difficult 
to believe that if the children . . . had a free choice, they would 
choose to be educated in districts with fewer resources, and 
hence with more antiquated plants, less experienced teachers, 
and a less diversified curriculum.”72 
Overall, court decisions on school finance matters have 
 
 64 Heise, supra note 40, at 1741. 
 65 Id. at 1761. 
 66 Percentage Distribution of Revenues for Public Elementary and Secondary 
Education in the United States, By Source: 2008–2009, EDUC. FIN. STAT. CTR. (2009), 
http://nces.ed.gov/edfin/graph_topic.asp?INDEX=4. 
 67 Lyndsey Layton, National High School Graduation Rates at Historic High, 
But Disparities Still Exist, WASH. POST (April 28, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/high-school-graduation-rates-at-
historic-high/2014/04/28/84eb0122-cee0-11e3-937f-d3026234b51c_story.html. 
 68 Id. 
 69 BAKER ET AL., supra note 43, at 11. 
 70 EDUCATION LAW, supra note 10. 
 71 Washakie Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo. 1980). 
 72 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 85 (1973). 
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been issued in forty-four of the fifty states.73 The American 
Civil Liberties Union has threatened to bring such a suit in 
Nevada, one of the states that has not yet experienced a school 
funding lawsuit, but it has not followed through at this time.74 
Iowa, another state where no decisions on the topic have been 
handed down, defended against its only school funding lawsuit 
in 2002.75 However, the suit was dropped when the legislature 
agreed to increase revenue for the complaining districts.76 In 
August of 2014, fourteen school districts sued for underfunding 
education in another no-decision state, Mississippi.77 The case 
has grown to include twenty-one districts, which are 
collectively demanding $230 million in funding.78 The state 
attorney general is seeking a dismissal of the case, and 
characterized the legislative inaction problem as one of the 
seminal reasons.79 
Court rulings in favor of plaintiffs are, of course, only the 
first step towards remedying these problems. From the results 
of the empirical analyses mentioned above, it appears that 
something breaks down after a court victory to cause these 
troubling outcomes. Some have hinted, and this Comment 
argues, that legislative inaction or pushback is where the 
progress towards proper educational funding breaks down.80 To 
further this problem, courts have become exasperated with the 
lack of real change in education funding and are giving up.81 
With that, proponents of school finance reform now have not 
 
 73 National Education Access Network, supra note 8. 
 74 Andrew Doughman, Education Advocates Threaten Lawsuit Over Funding 
Public Schools, LAS VEGAS SUN (May 1, 2013, 2:00 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/ 
news/2013/may/01/education-advocates-threaten-lawsuit-over-public-s/. 
 75 Tim Anderson, Full Court Pressure: Recent Supreme Court Ruling In Kansas 
Serves as a Reminder of the Judiciary’s Power to Shape State School Funding, CSG 
MIDWEST (Apr. 2014), http://www.csgmidwest.org/policyresearch/0314schoolfinance-
litigation.aspx. 
 76 Id. 
 77 The Associated Press, 14 School Districts Sue State for Underfunding 
Mississippi Adequate Educational Program, GULF LIVE (Aug. 28, 2014, 10:41 AM), 
http://blog.gulflive.com/mississippi-press-news/2014/08/14_school_districts_sue_state. 
html. 
 78 Jeff Amy, Hood Asks Judge to Throw Out School Funding Suit, HATTIESBURG 
AMERICAN (Oct. 8, 2014, 12:41 AM), http://www.hattiesburgamerican.com/story/news/ 
education/2014/10/07/school-funding-lawsuit/16889603/. 
 79 Id. (“[Attorney General] Hood’s office wrote that even though a 2006 law says 
Mississippi’s school aid formula must be fully funded, that guarantee has no power to 
bind future legislatures.”). 
 80 Reynolds, supra note 3, at 742. 
 81 Id. at 761. 
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one, but two hurdles to clear before they can make positive 
change—a win in the courts and action in the legislature. 
The current education finance litigation trend assumes that 
courts can influence educational spending. Up until this point, 
that assumption has not been entirely true.82 When a funding 
provision is declared constitutionally inadequate or unequal, 
there is the potential for disruption of school function, so courts 
can delay the ruling’s effective date to give school officials or 
the legislature time to fix whatever issues the court deems 
necessary.83 This practice may contribute to legislative inaction 
or pushback as well—give someone an inch and they take a 
mile, as the saying goes. These challenges are particularly 
prevalent in the cases discussed in the following section. 
III. SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION AND ITS POLITICAL 
RAMIFICATIONS 
This part examines and analyzes three states’ school 
finance litigation stories. It focuses on each state’s 
constitutional debate between its courts, legislature, executive, 
and public opinion. This part also analyzes the actions that 
courts took that may have contributed to their relative 
successes or failures. First, courts in Ohio learned that 
compromise in the face of negative public opinion resulted in 
its having to exit the debate. Second, decades of school finance 
litigation in New Jersey culminated in shutting down schools 
and, to some, a satisfactory resolution. Finally, the Washington 
judiciary attempted to combine the lessons learned in both of 
the previous states in a still-ongoing battle with its legislature, 
the full results of which are yet unseen. 
A. Ohio 
The Ohio Supreme Court battled with legislators for 
thirteen years over education finance in its most recent saga of 
cases, DeRolph v. State.84 Within this time, four different 
rulings all upheld students’ rights to adequately funded 
 
 82 Heise, supra note 40, at 1750. 
 83 EDUCATION LAW, supra note 10. 
 84 DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733 (Ohio 1997) [DeRolph I]; DeRolph v. State, 
728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000) [DeRolph II]; DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 
2001) [DeRolph III]; DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 2002) [DeRolph IV]; Tang, 
supra note 34, at 1209–10. 
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education.85 School finance litigation actually goes back as far 
as 1923 in Ohio, when the state supreme court made its first 
attempt at clarifying the education clause in the state 
constitution.86 That provision states that the legislature “shall 
make such provisions, by taxation, or otherwise, as, with the 
income arising from the school trust fund, will secure a 
thorough and efficient system of common schools throughout 
the state.”87 The court in that early case found for the plaintiffs 
(taxpayers and school districts who challenged unfair funding 
distributions), a harbinger for what was to come almost 
seventy years later.88 
The court’s constitutional power to decide such cases was 
secured in the interim. In Board of Education v. Walter, 
plaintiffs challenged the Ohio financing scheme once again, but 
this time made an equity argument.89 Like the equity cases 
brought in other states, the Walter plaintiffs did not prevail.90 
The majority looked to school finance decisions in New Jersey 
and Washington, both discussed below, in determining that the 
issue before the court was justiciable—not a political question 
beyond its reach, as the defendant State argued.91 
Then came the first of the DeRolph cases in 1991. Five 
school districts throughout the state asked the court to declare 
the public school finance system unconstitutional.92 The trial 
court found a number of shocking inadequacies in schools. Just 
seventeen percent of heating systems in these schools were 
deemed “satisfactory,” and thirty-one percent of fire alarm 
systems were deemed “adequate.”93 Almost seventy percent of 
schools had failed to remove asbestos, directly violating an 
 
 85 Tang, supra note 34, at 1209–10. 
 86 See Miller v. Korns, 140 N.E. 773 (Ohio 1923). 
 87 OHIO CONST. art. VI, § 2. 
 88 140 N.E. at 778–79 (opining that “a man who sends his children to private 
educational institutions may be required to help support public schools for other 
children, or that the man who has no children may be taxed to support schools for other 
men’s families. It is no gratuity, no private gift to an individual, nor to a particular 
district, to support the schools of the state. It is a contribution to the public, and not to 
a local purpose; a contribution to the community’s very life, which must be exacted of 
every citizen.”). 
 89 390 N.E.2d 813, 819 (Ohio 1979). 
90   Id.  
 91 Id. at 824. 
 92 DeRolph v. State, 677 N.E.2d 733, 734 (Ohio 1997).  
 93 Id. at 742.  
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Environmental Protection Agency mandate.94 One school 
building was sliding down a hill an inch per month.95 At 
another school, students were “subjected to breathing coal dust 
which [was] emitted into the air and actually cover[ed] the 
students’ desks after accumulating overnight.”96 “Obviously,” 
the court observed, “state funding of school districts cannot be 
considered adequate . . . .”97 
Despite these findings, the Ohio Supreme Court only struck 
down the school finance system by a slim four-to-three 
majority.98 The dissent thought school funding questions were 
nonjusticiable political questions.99 This disagreement among 
the justices touched off the constitutional battle that would 
continue between the majority and the Ohio legislature for 
years. Perhaps to appease the dissent, the court did not require 
the legislature to take any specific action, but did ask the 
legislature to create a new finance system and allowed the trial 
court to retain jurisdiction until it was satisfied.100 Based on a 
survey the legislature itself conducted, the court stated that 
ten billion dollars was necessary to bring funding to 
constitutional levels.101 
The legislature struggled to comply with the court’s order. 
Some lawmakers did not question the court’s constitutional 
authority to force compliance on the issue, while others 
expressed reservations.102 Ultraconservative legislators 
suggested stripping the court of jurisdiction or amending the 
constitution.103 Some even advocated impeaching the justices 
who made up the majority.104 The media made similar 
recommendations, and urged the legislature to ignore the 
court’s orders.105  In the wake of the court’s decision, the 
legislature appropriated an additional three hundred million 
 
 94 Id. at 743.  
 95 Id.  
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. at 744.  
 98 Id. at 735.  
 99 Id. at 782.  
 100 Id. at 747.  
 101 Id. at 742, 780.  
 102 Larry J. Obhof, DeRolph v. State and Ohio’s Long Road to an Adequate 
Education, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 83, 111–12 (2005), available at 
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1198&context=elj. 
 103 Id. at 112. See also Tang, supra note 34, at 1209–10. 
 104 Tang, supra note 34, at 1209–10. 
 105 Obhof, supra note 102, at 111. 
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dollars for improvements, just three percent of the amount the 
legislature’s survey required.106 The governor passed a bill 
purporting to change the school funding formula, but no 
substantive changes were truly made.107 The legislature offered 
up the issue to a vote, as a sales tax increase.108 This also 
failed.109 
As expected, the issue again rose to the Ohio Supreme 
Court a few years later.110 The same majority-dissent 
breakdown found the then-current funding scheme 
unconstitutional, but acknowledged that progress had been 
made.111 It also acknowledged the separation of powers issue, 
and reasoned that it had been deliberately conservative in 
allowing the legislature to define the legislation’s 
parameters.112 The court also upheld its authority to enforce its 
own orders; otherwise, the “power to find a particular act 
unconstitutional would be a nullity.”113 If a remedy is never 
enforced, it is not actually a remedy, the court opined.114 
Although the second DeRolph decision mainly echoed the 
first, legislative and public opinion was no longer as mixed. 
Many legislators, the governor, and commentators all 
disagreed with the holding.115 The author of the majority 
opinion managed to win re-election the next year despite a 
vocal and well-funded campaign to unseat her, with many 
attacks made specifically about the education decision.116 The 
legislature managed to appropriate another one billion dollars 
to school construction, again falling short of the original ten 
 
 106 Id. at 114. 
 107 Anne M. Hayes, Tension in the Judicial-Legislative Relationship: DeRolph v. 
State, 32 U. TOL. L. REV. 611, 637 (2001) (“Changes made to the school funding system 
under H.B. 650 were a tweaking of the existing system. There were no substantive 
changes made to the funding system or the formula for disbursing state basic aid.”). 
 108 Kerry A. White, Ohio Voters Reject Sales-Tax Hike for Schools, EDUC. WEEK, 
May 13, 1998, at 17, available at 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1998/05/13/35ohio.h17.html. 
 109 Id. 
 110 DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993 (Ohio 2000). 
 111 Id. at 1003 (“There are indications that Governor Taft and the General 
Assembly have taken some of the steps necessary to remedy a situation that has been 
neglected for more than twenty–five years.”). 
 112 Id. at 1002–03. 
 113 Id. at 1003.  
 114 Id.  
 115 Obhof, supra note 102, at 125–26. 
 116 Spencer Hunt, Anti-Resnick Ad Pulled, Replaced, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Oct. 
25, 2000), http://enquirer.com/editions/2000/10/25/loc_anti-resnick_ad.html. 
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billion dollar order, which likely was much larger by that 
time.117 At that point, the court contemplated holding the 
legislature in contempt.118 One of the justices, part of the 
original majority that struck down the Ohio funding plan, 
publicly commented that a contempt order was one of the 
possible routes, and that the court does ‘“have some power to do 
things when groups or individuals do not comply with our 
orders.’”119 The justice went on to explain that jail terms or 
fines could result, but did not outline how those penalties 
would work for an entire legislature.120 
With that, the Ohio Supreme Court considered the issue a 
third time in 2001.121 The plaintiffs suggested the court go the 
contempt route mentioned previously, along with a number of 
other controversial remedies.122 Again, the court found the 
legislature to be noncompliant, but hedged this by 
relinquishing its jurisdiction over the matter.123 Justices and 
commentators observed that this decision constituted a 
compromise between members of the court to end its 
involvement.124 
The court did, however, take a controversial step in 
DeRolph III by ordering the legislature to make specific 
modifications to school funding.125 Many, including some of the 
original majority members, found this to be a grave breach of 
constitutional boundaries.126 The state also felt this was 
improper judicial lawmaking and asked the court to 
reconsider.127 Further, the plaintiffs were unhappy with the 
decision as well, feeling it was a retreat from the previous 
 
 117 See Obhof, supra note 102, at 131. 
 118 James Drew, Contempt-of-Court Threat Hangs Over School-Funding Case, 
TOLEDO BLADE (June 10, 2001), http://www.toledoblade.com/State/2001/06/10/ 
Contempt-of-court-threat-hangs-over-school-funding-case.html; Spencer Hunt & Travis 
James Tritten, Resnick Explores Enforcing Directive, ENQUIRER (April 6, 2001), 
http://enquirer.com/editions/2001/04/06/loc_resnick_explores.html. 
 119 Drew, supra note 118; Hunt & Tritten, supra note 118. 
 120 Hunt & Tritten, supra note 118. 
 121 See DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 2001). 
 122 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 48, DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184 (Ohio 
2001) (No. 99-0570), available at 
http://www.bricker.com/documents/resources/schoolfund/scderolph518.pdf. 
 123 754 N.E.2d at 1190. 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. at 1200–01. 
 126 Id. at 1239–45. 
 127 DeRolph v. State, 780 N.E.2d 529, 535 (Ohio 2002). 
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decisions.128 The Ohio Supreme Court agreed one last time to 
hear the case. The original majority came together to vacate 
DeRolph III, reinstate DeRolph II, find the funding levels 
unconstitutional yet again, but relinquish jurisdiction for 
good.129 
The Ohio Supreme Court did what many other courts have 
done. It gave up and acquiesced to chronic legislative failure.130 
While it had the opportunity to take lasting measures in 
DeRolph III, it decided to err on the side of compromise, which 
allowed the problem to continue. Compromise is a hallmark of 
the legislative branch. The judiciary, on the other hand, is 
supposed to take the minority position where warranted, 
despite the potential unpopularity or uncertainty this may 
cause. Interestingly, DeRolph was the first education finance 
case in the state to attempt adequacy arguments.131 While that 
may have helped secure the plaintiffs’ victory, that step 
forward undoubtedly did not result in constitutionally-
mandated funding. Scholars have observed that, despite the 
“culmination” of the DeRolph cases, the fight for adequate 
school funding in Ohio never truly ended.132 After thirteen 
years, the court may have simply fallen victim to “battle 
fatigue.”133 
B. New Jersey 
If Ohio’s struggle seems exhausting, New Jersey endured 
the legal equivalent of the Thirty Years’ War. That state 
endured two distinct sets of long-lasting school finance 
litigation. The first was Robinson v. Cahill, which spanned 
seven different New Jersey Supreme Court opinions within 
three years.134 Students and others sued state officials, arguing 
that the state relied on a funding system that discriminated 
against low-income districts and imposed unequal burdens on 
 
 128 Obhof, supra note 102, at 135–36. 
 129 780 N.E.2d at 530. 
 130 Tang, supra note 34, at 1209–10. 
 131 Obhof, supra note 102, at 84. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. at 140. 
 134 Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) [Robinson I]; Robinson v. Cahill, 
306 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1973) [Robinson II]; Robinson v. Cahill, 335 A.2d 6 (N.J. 1975) 
[Robinson III]; Robinson v. Cahill, 339 A.2d 193 (N.J. 1975) [Robinson IV]; Robinson v. 
Cahill, 355 A.2d 129 (N.J. 1976) [Robinson V]; Robinson v. Cahill, 358 A.2d 457 (N.J. 
1976) [Robinson VI]; Robinson v. Cahill, 360 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1976) [Robinson VII]. 
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taxpayers.135 This was an equity claim, similar to that raised in 
Ohio. The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected it.136 The court 
still found the funding scheme unconstitutional under the state 
education clause, however.137 That clause provides, “[t]he 
Legislatures shall provide for the maintenance and support of a 
thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the 
instruction of all the children in the State between the ages of 
five and eighteen years.”138 The court issued a second opinion 
soon thereafter, extending the deadline for the legislature to 
reach an agreement.139 
Even with the extended deadline, the other branches of 
New Jersey’s government struggled to comply with the court’s 
ruling. The governor drew up a plan to change the school 
funding formula, part of which introduced a state income tax,140 
but his bill did not pass.141 The governor asked the state 
supreme court for relief and, in a third ruling, the court agreed 
to hear the case at a later date.142 In that fourth ruling, the 
court devised a remedy that would be put in place if the 
legislature could not come up with its own by the next school 
year.143 With only two days to spare, the legislature passed a 
law that increased funding to low-income school districts, and 
the state supreme court upheld the remedy as constitutional in 
its fifth decision of the case.144 
The New Jersey legislature did not follow through with the 
act it created.145 It failed to actually appropriate any money 
under the new law.146 With this overt legislative failure, the 
court took drastic action. In a sixth ruling, it enjoined the 
legislature from spending any money on public schools unless it 
funded the act it had created or found some new way to 
 
 135 Robinson I, supra note 134, at 276. 
 136 Id. at 283. 
 137 Id. at 298. 
 138 N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § IV. 
 139 Robinson II, supra note 134, at 66. 
 140 Alexandra Greif, Politics, Practicalities, and Priorities: New Jersey’s 
Experience Implementing the Abbott V Mandate, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 615, 619 
(2004). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Robinson III, supra note 134, at 7. 
 143 Robinson IV, supra note 134, at 198. 
 144 Robinson V, supra note 134, at 129. 
 145  Greif, supra note 140, at 620. 
 146 Id. 
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appropriate funds under the constitution.147 The legislature did 
nothing.148 In response, the court shut down schools for eight 
days because of the legislature’s failure to comply.149 The 
legislature then decided to act. It came together to approve a 
state income tax, which would fund the act it created.150 In the 
seventh and final ruling of the Robinson saga, the state 
supreme court withdrew the injunction and schools reopened.151 
As mentioned earlier, though, this did not end school finance 
litigation in New Jersey. 
Next came Abbott v. Burke, a line of cases that lasted 
twenty-four years and resulted in more than twenty opinions 
by the state’s courts.152 The case started in 1981, when the 
Education Law Center challenged the state’s public education 
funding scheme.153 The first ruling from the state supreme 
court came four years later, when the court transferred the 
case to an administrative law judge.154 That judge held the 
school funding law unconstitutional with respect to twenty-
eight low-income, urban school districts in the state.155 The 
state supreme court upheld this finding when it was challenged 
in the second Abbott decision.156 
Thereafter, the legislature and supreme court engaged in 
extensive back and forth litigation, with the legislature 
proposing funding schemes and the supreme court rejecting 
them.157 Finally, in its twentieth decision on the case, the court 
 
 147 Robinson VI, supra note 134, at 459. 
 148 Greif, supra note 140, at 620. 
 149 History of Funding Equity, STATE OF N.J, DEP’T OF EDUC., 
http://www.state.nj.us/education/archive/abbotts/chrono/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2016). 
 150 Greif, supra note 140, at 620. 
 151 Robinson VII, supra note 134, at 400 (N.J. 1976). 
 152 Tang, supra note 34, at 1209. 
 153 The History of Abbott v. Burke, EDUC. L. CTR., http://www.edlawcenter.org/ 
cases/abbott-v-burke/abbott-history.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2016). 
 154 Abbott v. Burke, 495 A.2d 376, 393 (N.J. 1985) [Abbott I]. 
 155 The History of Abbott v. Burke, supra note 153. Despite a more official 
designation as “SDA Districts” (Schools Development Authority), these districts have 
become known as “Abbott districts,” which is now a common phrase in New Jersey 
news and politics. See Matt Friedman, Sweeney Suggests Making Atlantic City an 
Abbott District, THE STAR-LEDGER, (July 23, 2014), http://www.nj.com/politics/ 
index.ssf/2014/07/sweeney_suggests_making_atlantic_city_an_abbott_district.html. 
The colloquialism even has its own Wikipedia page. Abbott District, WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abbott_district (last visited Jan. 8, 2016). 
 156 Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 383 (N.J. 1990) [Abbott II]. 
 157 The History of Abbott v. Burke, supra note 153. See also Abbott v. Burke, 643 
A.2d 575 (N.J. 1994) [Abbott III]; Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1997) [Abbott 
IV]; Abbott v. Burke, 710 A.2d 450 (N.J. 1998) [Abbott V]; Abbott v. Burke, 748 A.2d 82 
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was satisfied.158 It found the new legislative formula, 
designated the “School Funding Reform Act” (SFRA), to be 
constitutional.159 When the 2010 legislature then adopted 
Governor Chris Christie’s $1.1 billion cuts to the SFRA, 
however, the court again ordered the legislature to fully fund 
its proposal.160 
Surely, the need for finality is no greater anywhere else 
than here. New Jersey withstood almost three decades of non-
stop school finance litigation. Even if some feel that the Abbott 
litigation was ultimately successful, other states contemplating 
solutions to school finance disagreements would surely object to 
undertaking an expensive, exhausting, decades-long argument 
with the legislature to reach that ultimate goal. New Jersey 
took the long road to reach a resolution; judicial resources can 
likely be used more efficiently to solve such problems. Still, it 
must be acknowledged that a resolution was reached. When the 
court acted on its orders and shut down schools, the legislature 
came together to find a solution. 
C. Washington 
The Washington judiciary had no interest in replicating 
New Jersey’s school finance quagmire. Beginning with Seattle 
School District v. State, the state supreme court held that 
schools’ forced reliance on local levies for funding was 
unconstitutional and required the legislature to shoulder the 
burden for education funding, as per the state constitution.161 
That document states, “It is the paramount duty of the state to 
make ample provision for the education of all children residing 
 
(N.J. 2000) [Abbott VI]; Abbott v. Burke, 751 A.2d 1032 (N.J. 2000) [Abbott VII]; 
Abbott v. Burke, 790 A.2d 842 (N.J. 2002) [Abbott VIII]; Abbott v. Burke, 798 A.2d 602 
(N.J. 2002) [Abbott IX]; Abbott v. Burke, 832 A.2d 891 (N.J. 2003) [Abbott X]; Abbott v. 
Burke, 832 A.2d 906 (N.J. 2003) [Abbott XI]; Abbott v. Burke, 852 A.2d 185 (N.J. 2004) 
[Abbott XII]; Abbott v. Burke, 862 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2004) [Abbott XIII]; Abbott v. Burke, 
889 A.2d 1063 (N.J. 2005) [Abbott XIV]; Abbott v. Burke, 901 A.2d 299 (N.J. 2006) 
[Abbott XV]; Abbott v. Burke, 1 A.3d 602 (N.J. 2006) [Abbott XVI]; Abbott v. Burke, 
935 A.2d 1152 (N.J. 2007) [Abbott XVII]; Abbott v. Burke, 956 A.2d 923 (2008) [Abbott 
XVIII]; Abbott v. Burke, 960 A.2d 360 (2008) [Abbott XIX]. 
 158 Jessica Corbett, Thorough and Efficient Education: An Act Ending Wealth-
Based School Funding in New Jersey is Constitutional, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1027, 1027–28 
(2010). 
 159 Abbott v. Burke, 971 A.2d 989, 992 (N.J. 2009) [Abbott XX]. 
 160 The History of Abbott v. Burke, supra note 153.  
 161 90 Wash. 2d 476, 483–86 (1978). 
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within its borders . . . .”162 The court found this clause unique 
amongst other state constitution education clauses, requiring 
that education funding be the legislature’s foremost concern.163 
The court also found that the state’s “duty goes beyond 
mere reading, writing and arithmetic.”164 “Ample provision” 
meant that the state must provide opportunities to ready 
children for their role as citizens and competitors in the job 
market.165 Despite these strong edicts, the court did not retain 
jurisdiction over the case, trusting that the legislature would 
comply.166 One justice dissented, finding the legislative 
“ultimatums” inappropriate for separation of powers reasons.167 
The majority ruling, however, just resulted in further litigation 
of the same issue thirty-four years later. 
The Seattle School District court’s deference to the 
Washington legislature ultimately led to McCleary v. State in 
2012.168 The majority opinion echoed many of the sentiments 
from its precursor case.169 The state supreme court again found 
that the legislature was underfunding state schools.170 It held 
that the words “ample provision” required more than just 
minimum levels of funding, and “paramount duty” meant 
education comes before all else.171 This time, however, the court 
decided it would not be fooled twice, and retained jurisdiction 
over the case.172 Two justices concurred in part with the finding 
of a constitutional violation, but dissented in part over the 
retained jurisdiction.173 Overall, though, public opinion seemed 
largely in favor of the court’s ruling.174 
 
 162 WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1. 
 163 90 Wash. 2d at 498–500 (“The duty to make ‘ample provision’, as opposed to 
merely providing for a ‘general and uniform’ school system, is the only instance in 
which our constitution declares a specific state function to be a ‘paramount duty’ of the 
State.”). 
 164 Id. at 517. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Id. at 484 (“We do not retain jurisdiction over the parties or the action being 
confident the Legislature will comply fully with its constitutionally mandated duty.”). 
 167 Id. at 579 (Rossellini, J., dissenting). 
 168  173 Wash. 2d 477 (2012). 
 169  Id. 
 170 Id. at 484. 
 171 Id. at 515–20. 
 172 Id. at 484. 
 173 Id. at 547–50. 
 174 See Peter Callaghan, State’s McCleary Report Skips the Hard Questions, The 
BELLINGHAM HERALD (Sep. 5, 2013), http://www.bellinghamherald.com/ 
2013/09/05/3185915/states-mccleary-report-skips-the.html; Editorial Board, 
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Retaining jurisdiction meant the legislature was required to 
provide the court with ongoing progress reports.175 The court 
still “deferred to the legislature’s chosen means of discharging 
its constitutional duty,” but vowed that it would hold the 
legislature to any reforms it decided to adopt.176 State officials 
estimated they would need at least four billion dollars to make 
up their deficit.177 In its third report, though, the legislature 
candidly admitted that it had stopped making progress towards 
the “program of basic education as directed by the Court.”178 
Because the legislature failed to implement its own plan to 
increase funding to appropriate levels, the McCleary plaintiffs 
asked the court to do something in response.179 At this point, 
the legislature seemed to go on the defensive. As one journalist 
wrote, legislators began issuing “[a]mateur treatises on 
separation of powers and condescending reports explaining . . . 
how the budget works . . . . Oh, and snarky tweets about 
pounding sand.”180 The writer continued, likely echoing public 
sentiment: “[Q]uit whining. No one cares.”181 
In response to all of this, the court did do something. It 
issued a unanimous “show cause” order to the legislature, 
asking it to explain why it should not be held in contempt for 
 
Washington State Must Embrace a New Vision for Education, THE SEATTLE TIMES 
(Sep. 8, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/editorialsopinionpages/ 
2019095920_washingtonstatemustembraceanewvisionforeducation.html. But see, Brian 
M. Rosenthal, Conservatives Cry “Activism” After Losing Pair of Major Court Cases, 
THE SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 23, 2013, 7:00 PM), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2020628808_supremecourtxml.html. 
 175 Order, McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477 (2012) (No. 84362-7), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/PublicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-
7%20order%20-%209-11-2014.pdf. 
 176 Order to Show Cause, McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477 (2012) (No. 84362-
7), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/supreme% 
20Court%20News/84362-7_McCleary_ShowCauseOrder_201406124.pdf. 
 177 John Stang, Blurred Lines In Olympia: Is It Time to Start Arguing About the 
2015 Budget? CROSSCUT (Dec. 18, 2013), http://crosscut.com/2013/12/18/politics-
government/117966/inslee-budget-governor/. 
 178 Order, McCleary v. State, supra note 175. 
 179 Plaintiff/Respondents’ 2013 Post-Budget Filing at 47, McCleary v. State, 173 
Wash. 2d 477 (2012)(No. 84362-7), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/public 
Upload/Supreme%20Court%20News/84362-7Plaintiff-Respondents2013_PostBudget 
Filing.pdf. 
 180 Peter Callaghan, What Contempt for the Legislature Might Look Like, THE 
NEWS TRIBUNE (May 29, 2014), http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicupload/ 
eclips/2014%2005%2029%20Peter%20Callaghan%20What%20contempt%20for%20the
%20Legislature%20might%20look%20like.pdf. 
 181 Id. 
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violating a court order.182 At the plaintiffs’ urging, the court 
asked the legislature to ponder ordering the sale of state 
property to fund compliance, invalidating education funding 
cuts, or prohibiting any funding of education at all (which 
would mean shutting down schools, reminiscent of Robinson v. 
Cahill).183 A very controversial and public debate ensued until 
the time of the hearing. Opposing editorials poured into 
newspapers across the state,184 as many recognized the court 
was entering “uncharted waters.”185 
In its briefs, the legislature asked the court not to impose 
sanctions. “[W]e have found no case where any state’s highest 
court issued or affirmed contempt sanctions against that state’s 
own legislature. All of the cases Plaintiffs cite are federal cases 
and none involve[] a state legislature or implicate[] separation 
of powers . . . .”186 The legislature simply said that it needed 
more time for its warring factions to come to an agreement.187 A 
contempt order, it assured, was not necessary to get its 
attention.188 
This assurance, however, did not sway the court and what 
happened next was unprecedented.189 After finding the 
 
 182 Order to Show Cause, McCleary v. State, supra note 176. 
 183 Id.; Plaintiff/Respondents’ 2013 Post-Budget Filing, McCleary v. State, supra 
note 179. 
 184 Lauren Drake, Local Lawmakers Split on Supreme Court’s Role in Education 
Funding, THE COLUMBIAN, Sep. 3, 2014, available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/ 
content/publicupload/eclips/2014%2009%2005%20Local%20lawmakers%20split%20on
%20Supreme%20Courts%20role%20in%20education%20funding.pdf; Editorial Board, 
State AG’s Refresher on Separation of Powers Welcome, UNION BULLETIN (Aug. 29, 
2014), http://union-bulletin.com/news/2014/aug/31/state-ags-refresher-separation-
powers-welcome/; Chris Gregoire and John Spellman, Guest: Supreme Court Should 
Tread Carefully With Legislature Threats in McCleary Education Case, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Sep. 1, 2014, 5:13 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/2024422197_ 
chrisgregoirejohnspellmanopedmccleary02xml.html. 
 185 Daniel Jack Chasan, How Far Will the State Supreme Court Go on McCleary? 
CROSSCUT (Feb. 5, 2015), http://crosscut.com/2015/02/05/community-idea-
lab/123704/how-do-you-solve-problem-mccleary/. 
 186 State of Washington’s Reply at 15, McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477 (2012) 
(No. 84362-7), available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/ 
Supreme%20Court%20News/843627_StateOfWashingtonsReply.pdf. 
 187 State of Washington’s Opening Brief Addressing Order to Show Cause at 1–2, 
McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 477 (2012) (No. 84362-7), available at 
http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/supreme%20Court%20News/84362-
7_McCleary_OpeningBrief_20140711.pdf. 
 188 Order, McCleary v. State, supra note 175. 
 189 Washington State Supreme Court, Oral Arguments: McCleary, et al. v. State 
of Washington, TVW.ORG, at 24:00 (Sep. 3, 2014), 
http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2014090001. 
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legislature’s reasons unpersuasive, the court did what the Ohio 
Supreme Court had previously threatened to do: It held the 
entire state legislature in contempt.190 Despite the court’s prior 
lack of agreement about how to proceed with the case, the 
decision was unanimous.191 The question of sanctions that it 
posed to both sides remained unanswered at that time.192 “[I]n 
the interest of comity,” the court gave the legislature time to 
purge its contempt.193 If no agreement was reached by the end 
of the 2015 legislative session, the court stated it would 
reconvene to decide on sanctions or other remedies.194 
By this time, public opinion ranged from relief that the 
court decided to defer,195 to feeling that the court was “out of 
control.”196 This latter sentiment must have waned a bit, 
however. Two months later, a referendum requiring the 
legislature to “allocate funds to reduce class sizes and increase 
staffing support”197 passed, albeit by less than two percent.198 
The referendum was commonly referenced alongside the 
McCleary case.199 While this may have put more pressure on 
legislators to act according to the court’s order, some argued 
this will actually make it harder to fund the McCleary order 
 
 190 Order, McCleary v. State, supra note 175. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. 
 195 Editorial Board, Editorial: State Supreme Court’s Contempt Ruling Makes 
Point on Education, Not Obstacles, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Sep. 11, 2014, 4:49 PM), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/editorials/2024517832_mcclearyeditxml.html; Editorial 
Board, Legislature Correctly Gets More Time for School Solution, THE YAKIMA HERALD, 
Sep. 14, 2014, available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicupload/eclips/2014% 
2009%2015%20Legislature%20correctly%20gets%20more%20time%20for%20school%2
0solution.pdf.  
 196 Editorial Board, High Court’s Threat to Punish Legislature Goes Too Far, 
UNION BULLETIN (Sep. 15, 2014), http://union-bulletin.com/news/2014/sep/15/high-
courts-threat-punish-state-legislature-goes-t/. See also, Richard S. Davis, Court 
Finesses Crisis It Created, THE HERALD (Sep. 17, 2014, 12:01 AM), 
http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20140917/OPINION04/140919187. 
 197 Liv Finne, Citizens’ Guide to Initiative 1351: To Reduce Class Sizes, WASH. 
POL’Y CTR., Sep. 2014, available at http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/publications/brief/ 
citizens-guide-initiative-1351-reduce-class-sizes. 
 198 November 4, 2014 General Election Results: Initiative Measure No. 1351 
Concerns K–12 Education, WASH. SEC’Y OF STATE ELECTIONS AND VOTING, 
http://results.vote.wa.gov/results/20141104/State-Measures-Initiative-Measure-No-
1351-Concerns-K-12-education.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2016). 
 199 John Higgins, I-1351: Proposal Would Cut Class Sizes, Cost Billions, THE 
SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 11, 2014, 5:11 PM), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2024758146_electclasscostsxml.html. 
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because the initiative funding must come from already existing 
education budgets, instead of appropriating new money.200 
As of this writing, the McCleary story continues to unfold. 
In August of 2015, the Washington Supreme Court finally 
decided to answer its open-ended question about sanctions and 
imposed fines of $100,000 per day against the state.201 The fines 
are held “for the benefit of basic education,” although questions 
remain as to how the court will enforce the payment of those 
fines.202 
The Washington legislature seemed to be plagued by an 
especially deep-seated form of resistance. While it seemed as if 
it had made changes to the school finance laws at first, it never 
actually placed itself under any statutory obligation to fully 
fund education.203 The legislature’s “reforms” allowed it to 
simply adjust its formula to account for short-term political 
goals, while feigning compliance with the state constitution.204 
The court clearly learned that the kind of deference it gave the 
legislature in Seattle School District only allowed the problem 
to arise again at a later date, and that lack of finality is 
beneficial to no one. That kind of solution is simply a surface 
bandage for an issue requiring deeper surgery. The contempt 
citation, however, may prove effective. The State of 
Washington has generally fallen below the national average in 
education spending per student,205 and the question remains as 
to whether the legislature will be able to change that and purge 
its contempt by crafting a real, sustainable solution to the 
problem.206 
 
 200 Finne, supra note 197. 
 201 Joseph O’Sullivan, School Funding Back on Table as Court Fines State 
$100,000 A Day, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015, 10:51 AM), 
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/education/supreme-court-orders-100000-per-
day-fines-in-mccleary-case/. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Daniel C. Stallings, Comment, Washington State’s Duty to Fund K–12 
Schools: Where the Legislature Went Wrong and What It Should Do to Meet Its 
Constitutional Obligation, 85 WASH. L. REV. 575, 593–94 (2010). 
 204 Id. 
 205 Id. at 575. 
 206 Kansas underwent a separation of powers struggle over school funding 
strikingly similar to Washington’s. See REBELL, supra note 33, at 31; Richard E. Levy, 
Gunfight at the K–12 Corral: Legislative vs. Judicial Power in the Kansas School 
Finance Litigation, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1021 (2006). Given the substantial overlap, I 
decided not to include an analysis of the case. 
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IV.  IDENTIFYING THE ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS TO THE NEVER-
ENDING CYCLE 
This part proceeds in two main sections. First, it brings 
together both the broad and specific school finance history 
examined previously to identify the true issue behind 
continued failures. While many factors can contribute to this 
continued inadequacy in state schools, this part argues that 
legislative inaction is the culprit and must be targeted. Second, 
this part will compare the possible solutions to this issue, 
transitioning into a discussion of which solutions may be the 
most effective. Continued litigation, special masters, public 
votes, and court-ordered sanctions are discussed as possible 
solutions. 
A. The Issues 
From an examination of these three representative states, 
one can see the basic issue is legislative inaction.207 Despite 
increasingly successful lawsuits, great strides are not being 
made because legislatures rarely follow through and assign 
additional new funding to schools.208 They are the only ones 
that have the power to do so,209 so the burden falls fully on 
them. Essentially, this renders courts ineffective. Their rulings 
are no more than empty words if they never enforce their 
mandates. Because of this perceived inability, a secondary 
problem has arisen: many courts are giving up on the issue and 
refusing to do anything.210 
This judicial weariness is troublesome. Some courts have 
rejected suits under the political question doctrine or other 
justiciability grounds.211 Others have blatantly stopped 
 
 207 Reynolds, supra note 3, at 749–52 (“[L]egislative responses often d[o] little to 
remedy the inequality . . . [P]laintiff victories rarely produce a systematic overhaul of 
the school funding formulas. In part, that may be because legislators have not always 
rushed to implement their court-imposed duty.”). 
 208 See supra Part III. 
 209 See Ronald Snell, The Power of the Purse: Legislatures that Write State 
Budges Independently of the Governor, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (March 2008), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/the-power-of-the-purse-legislatures-that-
write-st.aspx (“All state constitutions require that the state legislature enact 
appropriations in order for money to be spent from the treasury.”). 
 210 Reynolds, supra note 3, at 761 (“Although a small number of state courts has 
long refused to become embroiled in school funding debates, a new round of ‘judicial 
withdrawal’ is emerging . . . .”). 
 211 Tang, supra note 34, at 1208. 
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trying.212 This problem is likely exacerbated in states where 
judges face election. School funding cases like those in Ohio, 
New Jersey, and Washington are highly controversial, highly 
politicized, and garner lots of media attention. Judges striving 
for re-election do not want to be the target of scathing op-eds 
and radio or television commercials if they want to keep their 
jobs. It is a difficult position in which to find oneself. Those 
judges cannot continue to protect rights if they lose their 
positions to candidates unsympathetic to school finance 
plaintiffs. Venturing off the well-trodden constitutional path to 
protect those rights could result in undesirable, very public 
backlash. 
Along those same lines, voters will not necessarily step into 
the fray either. While Washington’s vote was more or less 
successful, the referendum in Ohio to bolster its supreme court 
ruling failed.213 The latter result is predictable and 
understandable; raising taxes, for however noble a cause, is 
rarely a popular idea.214 Even at the local level, school levies 
are notorious failures, which is what prompts many school 
finance litigation cases at the outset.215 Clearly, part of the 
problem cannot also be a solution. Where the facts and the law 
warrant, the most vital role of the judiciary is to protect the 
unpopular, but absolutely necessary, civil rights of the 
minority.216 
All of this ultimately means that students across the 
country continue to underachieve despite successful rulings 
and reforms.217 Moreover, court decisions in some states are 
actually associated with subsequent declines in educational 
funding, suggesting a serious lack of judicial efficacy.218 So, 
what can a court do when faced with a recalcitrant legislature 
and unconstitutionally inadequate levels of education funding? 
 
 212 See supra Part III.A. 
 213 See supra Parts III.A, III.C. 
 214 See Fewer Want Spending to Grow, But Most Cuts Remain Unpopular, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Feb. 10, 2011), available at http://www.people-press.org/2011/02/10/fewer-
want-spending-to-grow-but-most-cuts-remain-unpopular/. 
 215 Reynolds, supra note 3, at 751–52. See, e.g., Terra Goodnight, All Ten School 
Levies for New Operating Funds Fail, INNOVATION OHIO (Aug. 7, 2013), 
http://innovationohio.org/2013/08/07/all-ten-school-levies-for-new-operating-funds-fail/ 
(“Typically 35% of requests for additional funds succeed.”). 
 216 Terrance Sandlow, Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 
1164 (1977). See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 217 Heise, supra note 40, at 1741. 
 218 Id. at 1761. 
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B. The Solutions 
1. Further litigation 
One possible solution is to simply continue allowing 
plaintiffs to bring school funding cases to the courts, and 
continuing to rule in their favor. Proponents of judicial 
deference and conservatism argue this is, in fact, all that a 
court can do. Separation of powers and consideration for a co-
equal branch of government require that a court not exercise 
the legislature’s “power of the purse.” This, however, is a 
massive waste of judicial time and resources. New Jersey, 
discussed above, is a prime example. While this is the “safe” 
option, unlikely to cause any constitutional conflicts, it can be 
exhausting and eventually unfruitful. It encourages quick fixes 
to the problem instead of a deeper overhaul of faulty systems. 
Further, there are ways to appropriately use judicial power 
without interfering with the legislature’s power of the purse. 
Most importantly, this solution directly violates that important 
principal of finality revered throughout the legal system. 
2. Special masters 
Some have advocated for appointing a special master to 
handle the specifics of school funding cases,219 and courts have 
certainly used them for this purpose in the past.220 Special 
masters are appointed by courts to manage aspects of a case, 
typically when they are very complex or fact-heavy. Both 
parties must consent to the appointment of a special master.221 
Special masters cannot make any binding budget changes or 
force the legislature to comply in any way, however.222 They 
typically just conduct research, make findings of fact, or 
oversee proceedings.223 Even if they were to outline a proposal 
for increasing school funding, the legislature has likely heard 
plenty of “proposals.” It is agreeing on one that is the problem. 
Unfortunately, special masters are by no means enforcement 
 
 219 Lisa MacFarlane, Court Should Appoint a K–12 “Special Master”, THE 
OLYMPIAN (Sep. 14, 2014), http://www.theolympian.com/2014/09/14/3313427/court-
should-appoint-a-k-12-special.html. 
 220 David F. Herr, State Court Rules and Practices Regarding Special Masters, 
SL083 ALI-ABA 19, 33 (Nov. 2005). 
 221 Id. at 25. 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. at 27–31. 
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mechanisms when it comes to legislative rebuffs. 
3. Public vote 
Courts could also take the “hopeful” route: hope that the 
media speaks kindly of their decision; hope that public opinion 
is on their side; hope that someone puts education funding up 
to a vote of the people; and hope that the measure passes. This, 
of course, means the court has no power over anything, and the 
fate of students is entirely left up to voters. Knowing that these 
are the same voters that put hesitant legislators in office to 
begin with does not bode well. As in Ohio, even if this route 
takes the state up to the point of a referendum, getting the 
required number of votes in favor can be a challenge. Again, 
tax hikes are not popular items at the ballot box, and the 
chronic failure of school levies is often the basis for school 
finance litigation anyway.224 Even if all the pieces were to fall 
into place, the legislature may fail to appropriate new money to 
schools, and simply reallocate the current budget. Further, the 
serendipitous occurrence of winning a public vote once will 
likely only solve the funding issues for a period of time. With 
inflation, the increasing educational competitiveness of other 
nations, and the advancing complexity of skills students need 
as a baseline for entering the adult world, the baseline for 
“adequate funding” will surely change over time. 
4. Sanctions 
As we have seen, some courts did not turn their backs on 
students. They kept fighting, even in the face of opposition, to 
protect constitutional rights. In Washington, this meant 
holding the legislature in contempt to enforce their ruling.225 In 
New Jersey, this meant acting on that contempt and shutting 
down schools.226 These sanctions are clearly drastic, last-resort 
measures—but when civil rights are continually being violated, 
those kinds of measures may be the only way to elicit a 
resolution. 
Contempt is “conduct that defies the authority or dignity of 
a court or legislature. Because such conduct interferes with the 
administration of justice, it is punishable, usually by fine or 
 
 224 See sources supra note 212. 
 225 See supra Part III.C. 
 226 See supra Part III.B. 
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imprisonment.”227 Contempt is the court’s power to bolster its 
authority, and it is an important mechanism by which it can 
enforce its orders.228 It originates in the English common law, 
but Blackstone writes that it is “as antient [sic] as the laws 
themselves.”229 This power of the court, Blackstone wrote, 
“must be an inseparable attendant upon every superior 
tribunal,” because “laws without a competent authority to 
secure their administration from disobedience and contempt, 
would be vain and nugatory.”230 
Contempt is a valuable tool in a court’s toolbox when it 
comes to noncompliance. The effectiveness of contempt orders 
for nonpayment of support obligations in family law, for 
example, has been analyzed in a number of states.231 A 
Michigan study found that contempt was a powerful deterrent 
against this nonpayment, with counties that used contempt 
incarceration as an enforcement tool increasing their 
collections by a greater percentage than counties that did 
not.232 A Massachusetts study found that less than 0.3 percent 
of cases where contempt was used for nonpayers resulted in jail 
time.233 In Oregon, civil contempt resulted in a two hundred 
percent increase in collections.234 Oklahoma and Minnesota 
reported that contempt, while a last resort, is highly effective 
in extracting child support from nonpayers.235 The threat of jail 
time often means contemnors “discover” resources to pay their 
obligations.236 But will this work with legislative bodies? 
Because of a lack of actual occurrences, no comprehensive 
studies have been undertaken, but time will tell as 
Washington’s legislature now attempts to purge its contempt.237 
Similarly drastic measures worked during New Jersey’s first 
 
 227 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 360–61 (9th ed. 2009). 
 228 Jennifer Fleischer, In Defense of Civil Contempt Sanctions, 36 COLUM. J.L. & 
SOC. PROBS. 35, 35 (2002). 
 229 4 BLACKSTONE 285. 
 230 Id. at 284–85. 
 231 Contempt Can Be an Effective Enforcement Tool, THE PUNDIT (Friend of the 
Court Bureau, Lansing, Mich.), Nov. 2011 at 1, available at 
http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/OfficesPrograms/FOC/Documents/Pundits/2
011%2011%20Pundit.pdf. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2572 (2011). 
 237 See supra Part III.C. 
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round of school finance cases.238 
Courts are adversarial in nature with respect to the parties 
before them, and can even be adversarial when dealing with 
other branches of government.239 Courts should use their full 
powers to enforce their orders and push uncooperative 
legislatures to comply; ordering compliance with the 
constitution is, after all, the court’s duty just as much as it is 
the legislature’s.240 A noted school finance scholar recommends 
vigilance on the part of courts.241 They should not sit idly by as 
the other branches ignore their orders. In order to bring 
finality to the school finance issues states face, courts should 
treat legislatures just like normal individuals who ignore court 
orders. The next part will expand on this recommendation and 
discuss how courts should address common counter-arguments. 
V. RECOMMENDATION FOR STATE COURTS IN SCHOOL 
FUNDING STANDOFFS 
Many have aptly wondered: are such drastic measures, like 
holding an entire state legislature in contempt, even 
constitutional? Beyond the cases discussed, no known instances 
of this exact situation exist.242 While state courts have held 
individual legislators in contempt,243 an entire branch of state 
government has apparently not been thusly sanctioned outside 
New Jersey and Washington. Those two courts’ specific 
sanctions appear to be unprecedented, as one state’s counsel 
argued.244 It even appears to be unprecedented when it comes 
to other kinds of cases, not just education finance. 
Surely, there are separation of powers and other 
 
 238 See supra Part III.B. 
 239 Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due 
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181 
(2005). The judiciary is “adversarial” with other branches all the time; they often order 
the legislative or executive branches to take certain actions. This is the whole point of 
our system of checks and balances. 
 240 McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d 541 (“[T]his court cannot stand on the 
sidelines and hope the State meets its constitutional mandate to amply fund education. 
Article IX, section 1 is a mandate, not to a single branch of government, but to the 
entire state. We will not abdicate our judicial role.”). 
 241 James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance Litigation, 86 TEX. L. 
REV. 1223, 1260 (2008). 
 242 Chasan, supra note 185. 
 243 Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990). 
 244 State of Washington’s Reply, McCleary v. State, supra note 186. 
4.Davis.PubEdit.117-159 - Proof 2.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/22/16  11:53 AM 
1] SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION 147 
constitutional questions inherent in one branch sanctioning 
another. Editorial boards across the state in Washington 
rebuked the court for this very reason when it threatened to 
hold the legislature in contempt.245 The executive branch in 
New Jersey also voiced these concerns during its constitutional 
row.246 Commentators in both states (often despite lack of legal 
training) were sure that such actions were beyond the powers 
of a court.247 I submit that it is constitutional.248 I recommend 
that courts choose this route when faced with situations similar 
to those above. Because this solution lacks any legal precedent, 
however, the recommendation will be by way of the closest 
comparable situations. The rest of this section looks at the text 
of contempt statutes and draws comparisons to the most 
similar situations in history, in order to recommend how courts 
should go about redressing their own dilemmas. It also 
addresses some common counter-arguments that are raised 
during these constitutional crises and suggests how courts may 
rebut them. 
A. Courts Should Look to State Statutes and Constitutions for 
Support 
In Washington, contempt of court means intentional 
 
 245 Editorial, State AG’s Refresher on Separation of Powers Welcome, UNION-
BULLETIN (Aug. 29, 2014),http://union-bulletin.com/news/2014/aug/31/state-ags-
refresher-separation-powers-welcome/; Editorial, State Supreme Court Should Be 
Cautious in McCleary School-Funding Case, THE SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 30, 2014), 
http://seattletimes.com/html/editorials/2024422163_mcclearyedit31xml.html; Tracy 
Warner, The Washington Supreme Court is Within Inches of Overstepping Its 




 246 Marra, supra note 29, at 789–90 (“The Abbott XXI decision has drawn the 
attention of many critics, the most vocal of which has arguably been New Jersey 
Governor Chris Christie. The Governor, intent on reworking the educational structure 
of New Jersey on every level, wishes to establish that the power to make decisions 
regarding appropriations lies solely in the hands of the executive and legislative 
branches of the state government.”). 
 247 See State AG’s Refresher on Separation of Powers Welcome, supra note 245. 
 248 REBELL, supra note 33, at 92; Phil Talmadge, Legal Analysis: Constitutional 
Implications of Washington Supreme Court’s Remedy in McCleary vs. State, WASH. 
POL’Y CTR. (Apr. 2014), http://www.washingtonpolicy.org/publications/brief/legal-
analysis-constitutional-implications-washington-supreme-courts-remedy-mccle. Contra 
Erwin Chemerinsky, The Essential But Inherently Limited Role of the Courts in Prison 
Reform, 13 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 307, 314 (2008) (“[A court] cannot realistically—and 
probably not legally—hold the members of the legislature in contempt of court for 
failing to provide adequate funding.”). 
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“disobedience of any lawful judgment, decree, order, or process 
of the court.”249 The New Jersey contempt statute says that 
courts have the power to punish for contempt in cases of 
“[d]isobedience or resistance . . . by any party . . . or any person 
whatsoever to any lawful writ, process, judgment, order or 
command of the court.”250 Ohio punishes a person for contempt 
if he or she is guilty of “[d]isobedience of, or resistance to, a 
lawful writ, process, order, rule, judgment, or command of a 
court or officer.”251 
Courts should use contempt statutes like these as a basis 
for the legislature’s contempt.252 Many of these statutes in some 
way mention that the sanctions may apply to “people” or 
“persons.”253 A legislature likely falls within the meaning of 
“people,” though none of the cited contempt statutes have a 
definition section that would aid in answering that question 
outright.254 Surely, a “legislature” is comprised of people by the 
ordinary definition of the word. Single legislators have been 
held in contempt.255 So, what would stop a court from 
sanctioning an entire group of them? Further, if legislators are 
representatives of the people, and courts may hold ordinary 
people in contempt, why not the legislature? If it is because 
legislatures are an entity of people, and not an individual, that 
is unpersuasive as well. Companies can be held in contempt.256 
On the face of the statutes, it would seem that legislators, or a 
group of them, could likely be subject to the contempt laws. 
As one court observed, “[t]he ultimate power to interpret, 
construe and enforce the constitution of this State belongs to 
the judiciary . . . . [T]he courts have ample power, and will go to 
any length within the limits of judicial procedure, to protect 
such constitutional guaranties.”257 If a certain degree of 
 
 249 WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.010(1)(b) (2015). 
 250 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:10–1 (West 2015). 
 251 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705.02(A) (West 2015). 
 252 Missouri, however, has expressly prohibited courts from using their contempt 
power to enforce civil rights. MO. ANN. STAT. § 476.150 (West 2015). 
 253 WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.010 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:10 (West 2015); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705 (West 2015). 
 254 WASH. REV. CODE § 7.21.010 (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:10 (West 2015); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2705 (West 2015). 
 255 Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990). 
 256 Zack Whittaker, Microsoft Refuses to Hand Over Foreign Data, Held in 
Contempt of Court, ZDNET (Sep. 10, 2014), http://www.zdnet.com/article/microsoft-
refuses-to-hand-over-foreign-data-held-in-contempt-of-court/. 
 257 Seattle Sch. Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 496, 501 (1978) (quoting 
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education funding is guaranteed in a state constitution (as it is 
in every state), it is then a positive constitutional right, instead 
of a negative one. Therefore, the court’s analysis should be 
different than the typical rational basis test.258 This is not an 
arena in which the court is concerned with whether the state 
has done too much. Rather, it must consider whether the state 
has done enough.259 Positive constitutional rights require courts 
to ask if the state action or inaction achieves, or is reasonably 
likely to achieve, the desired ends.260 If the answer is “no,” then 
the court has the responsibility, not just the option, to remedy 
the situation.261 
Legislative immunity should not be persuasive to courts 
considering contempt as a solution to the school finance 
problem. Washington’s legislature brought this up in its 
briefing, stating it would be immune from any contempt order 
as per the state constitution’s “speech and debate clause.”262 
The federal constitution and forty-three other state 
constitutions provide similar protection for their legislators.263 
A closer look at the texts show these constitutional guarantees 
typically only protect what legislators say in their work from 
criminal or civil sanctions. Hence, it protects their words. It 
does not protect their actions, especially omissions that violate 
a citizen’s civil rights. Many state courts have interpreted this 
privilege even more narrowly than the one given to Congress.264 
As some have argued since the Civil Rights Era, “the judicial 
power necessary to enforce court orders and command respect 
overrides the policy supporting the immunity doctrine.”265 
Further, as will be revealed below, the privilege usually 
extends only to individual members of the legislative body, not 
 
Gottstein v. Lister, 88 Wash. 462, 493 (1915). 
 258 See McCleary v. State, 173 Wash. 2d at 519; Recent Case, Colorado Supreme 
Court Upholds State’s School Finance System as Rationally Related to the “Thorough 
and Uniform” Mandate of the Colorado Constitution’s Education Clause, 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 803, 807 (2013). 
 259 173 Wash. 2d at 519. 
 260 Id. 
 261 REBELL, supra note 33, at 48. 
 262 State of Washington’s Opening Brief Addressing Order to Show Cause, 
McCleary v. State, supra note 187. 
 263 Steven F. Huefner, The Neglected Value of the Legislative Privilege in State 
Legislatures, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 221, 224 (2003). 
 264 Id. 
 265 Legal Sanctions to Enforce Desegregation in the Public Schools: The Contempt 
Power and the Civil Rights Act, 65 YALE L.J. 630, 641 (1956). 
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to the body as whole, which is typically the party to an 
education finance action.266 Therefore, courts can likely impose 
sanctions against the entire legislative body if necessary to 
protect students’ civil right to an adequately funded education. 
B. Courts Should Look to Federal Contempt Proceedings 
Against the President for Precedential Value 
Court attempts to enforce their rulings against co-equal 
branches of government bring to mind Worcester v. Georgia.267 
In that 1832 case, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Georgia 
laws that expanded the state’s jurisdiction over the Cherokee 
nation.268 The laws were part of an attempt to remove the 
Native Americans from the state.269 Chief Justice John 
Marshall held that Native American nations were independent, 
sovereign states.270 Although they were under the United 
States’ protection, he wrote, “[p]rotection does not imply the 
destruction of the protected.”271 
Georgia ignored this ruling, however, and continued its 
campaign to remove the Cherokees.272 President Andrew 
Jackson also ignored the ruling and allowed Georgia to proceed 
with removal.273 Moreover, President Jackson actually asked 
the Cherokees to leave the state or submit to Georgia’s rule.274 
In response to the Supreme Court opinion, President Jackson 
purportedly said, “John Marshall has made his decision. Now 
let him enforce it.”275 Unfortunately, the Justice did not.276 This 
ultimately led to the Trail of Tears, an incident in which the 
federal government forced the Cherokees from their territory 
 
 266 See Part V. See also Huefner, supra note 263, at 262. 
 267 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
 268 Id. at 595 (1832) (“The act of the State of Georgia, under which the plaintiff in 
error was prosecuted, is consequently void, and the judgment a nullity.”). 
 269 Tim Alan Garrison, Worcester v. Georgia (1832), NEW GA. ENCYCLOPEDIA 
(Oct. 1, 2014), http://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/ 
worcester-v-georgia-1832 (“In the 1820s and 1830s Georgia conducted a relentless 
campaign to remove the Cherokees . . . An infuriated Georgia legislature responded by 
purporting to extend its jurisdiction over the Cherokees . . . .”). 
 270 31 U.S. at 561. 
 271 Id. at 518. 
 272 Garrison, supra note 269. 
 273 Id. 
 274 Id. 
 275 Id. 
 276 Id. 
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and relocated them to Oklahoma.277 So, if the U.S. Supreme 
Court had no enforcement power against the President, why 
would any state court have similar powers against its own 
legislative body? 
The courts do have enforcement powers against the 
executive branch, although they have only recognized this 
ability in recent years. In fact, courts have held the executive 
branch in contempt. President Clinton was the first president 
held in contempt of court, for willfully giving false testimony 
about his romantic relationship with Monica Lewinsky.278 The 
federal judge in that case noted that, despite the lack of 
precedent for her ruling, no constitutional barrier existed to 
imposing sanctions.279 These sanctions included payment of the 
plaintiff’s legal fees and reimbursement of court costs.280 The 
monetary sanctions are similar to those considered by courts in 
the school funding context.281 
A federal court also found President Obama’s 
administration in contempt in 2011 when the administration 
reinstituted a deep water drilling moratorium that a court had 
previously invalidated.282 The court then ordered the 
government to pay the plaintiff’s legal fees.283 As plaintiff’s 
counsel noted, “[t]he government was not at liberty to impose 
its own will after the court struck down the policy.”284 “The 
government, like any citizen, had to obey the ruling, even if it 
didn’t like it,” he continued.285 This is similar to an education 
finance situation like the three discussed: one branch of 
government continually failed to act according to a co-equal 
court’s order, and was consequently sanctioned. State courts 
should therefore be confident knowing that their actions have 
precedent in this federal context. 
 
 277 Id. 
 278 John M. Broder & Neil A. Lewis, Clinton is Found to be in Contempt on Jones 
Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 1999, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/ 
04/13/us/clinton-is-found-to-be-in-contempt-on-jones-lawsuit.html. 
 279 Id. Perhaps ironically, the judge that found President Clinton in contempt 
was a former law student of his. Id. 
 280 Id. 
 281 See Part III.C. 
 282 Laurel Calkins, U.S. In Contempt Over Gulf Drill Ban, Judge Rules, 
BLOOMBERG BUS. (Feb. 3, 2011, 12:53 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2011-02-03/u-s-administration-in-contempt-over-gulf-drill-ban-judge-rules. 
 283 Id. 
 284 Id. 
 285 Id. 
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C. Courts Should Look to Federal Contempt Proceedings 
Against Legislative Officials for Precedential Value 
Federal courts have attempted to spearhead reforms much 
like those needed for school funding in the prison reform 
context.286 In 1972, a Texas inmate filed a handwritten petition 
against the Texas Department of Corrections.287 This petition 
detailed the constitutional violations that were taking place in 
his jail: unlawful solitary confinement, overcrowding, 
harassment, and lack of medical care.288 The massive opinion 
that resulted, totaling more than one hundred pages,289 was the 
basis for “a complete overhaul of the Texas prison system.”290 
The case continued for decades as the judge took an active role 
in the reform.291 
At one point, the judge held the Texas Department of 
Corrections in contempt for failing to implement provisions of a 
settlement agreement, threatening fines up to twenty-four 
million dollars per month.292 The judge who oversaw the case 
and issued the contempt citation “incurred the wrath of many” 
for his activism, but was “one of four forces which converged to 
force legislative action.”293 California recently witnessed a 
similar series of prison reform cases.294 The governor and other 
state officials were threatened with contempt unless the state 
released certain inmates.295 Like students, prisoners are a 
voiceless minority needing the staunch protection of courts. 
Federal judges, however, have a much easier time taking these 
actions than state judges, due to the job security factor.296 This 
is likely a reason they have been more comfortable using 
 
 286 REBELL, supra note 33, at 4. 
 287 Prison Reform: Ruiz v. Estelle, THE WILLIAM WAYNE JUSTICE PAPERS (2014), 
http://tarlton.law.utexas.edu/exhibits/ww_justice/ruiz_v_estelle.html. 
 288 Id. 
 289 Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265, 1265–1390 (S.D. Tex. 1980). 
 290 Prison Reform: Ruiz v. Estelle, supra note 287. 
 291 Chantale Fiebig, Legislating from the Bench: Judicial Activism in California 
and Its Increasing Impact on Adult Prison Reform, 3 STAN. J.C.R. & C.L. 131, 147 
(2007). 
 292 RICHARD L. ABEL, THE LAW AND SOCIETY READER 271 (1995). 
 293 FRANK KEMERER, WILLIAM WAYNE JUSTICE: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 396 
(2010). 
 294 See Fiebig, supra note 291. 
 295 Paige St. John, Federal Judges Order California to Free 9,600 Inmates, L.A. 
TIMES (June 20, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jun/20/local/la-me-ff-brown-
prisons-20130621. 
 296 U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 1. 
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controversial powers to enforce their orders. With this 
precedent, though, state courts should take advantage of their 
given enforcement mechanisms. 
In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has specifically endorsed 
federal judges holding local governmental bodies in contempt 
for noncompliance with an order to enact necessary legislation. 
In Spallone v. United States, a district court found the city of 
Yonkers, New York, to be purposefully engaging in housing 
segregation and enjoined it from continuing the practice.297 The 
city council, which had sole legislative power, did not comply.298 
The court held the city as a whole, and each individual council 
member, in contempt and imposed sanctions.299 
The Court of Appeals rejected the contemnors’ legislative 
immunity argument, holding that it “does not insulate them 
from compliance with a consent judgment . . . which has been 
approved by their legislative body.”300 The U.S. Supreme Court 
agreed that contempt was proper against the city as a whole, 
but not the individual councilmembers, as they had not been 
found individually liable in the holding below.301 Therefore, 
courts faced with legislative pushback against an education 
finance order, would likely be wise to impose sanctions against 
the entire legislative body, unless individual representatives 
had been a party to the original action. 
Another illustrative historical separation of powers struggle 
is found in the school desegregation cases during the Civil 
Rights Era. Following the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of 
Education decisions,302 which mandated desegregation of the 
nation’s schools, some state officials vehemently resisted 
federal court orders to start implementing their rulings.303 A 
prominent example was the “Little Rock Crisis.”304 A federal 
court ordered Little Rock Central High School to integrate, but 
 
 297 493 U.S. 265, 268 (1990). 
 298 Id. at 272. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. at 273. 
 301 Id. at 276. 
 302 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [Brown I]; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 
349 U.S. 294 (1955) [Brown II]. 
 303 ANDREW J. DUNAR, AMERICA IN THE FIFTIES 219–20 (2006); Bush v. Orleans 
Parish School Board and the Desegregation of New Orleans Schools, FED. JUD. CTR., 
http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/tu_bush_narrative.html (last visited Jan. 8, 
2016). 
 304 DUNAR, supra note 303, at 219. 
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Arkansas Governor Orval Faubus disagreed with the ruling.305 
To block African-American students from attending, the 
governor sent the state National Guard to the school every 
day.306 The federal court then held Governor Faubus in 
contempt of its ruling.307 This caused the governor to dismiss 
the National Guard and allow the children to attend.308 While 
President Eisenhower was forced to dispatch federal troops to 
quell the citizen mob that ensued afterward,309 the contempt 
power was successful in bringing about the court’s decree. 
At the time these state officials were fighting against 
desegregation, many now-familiar arguments surfaced: judges 
were violating separation of powers, and the social problems 
were too complex for the judiciary to handle.310 The situation 
became much easier for courts to handle with Title VI of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, when Congress reserved the right to 
withdraw funding from school districts that refused to 
desegregate.311  These arguments then became moot. 
In the context of school funding, access to an adequate 
education is a civil right.312 It is enumerated in every state’s 
constitution and guaranteed positively to the children of the 
state, just like freedom of speech, religion, and the like. There 
is bipartisan support for the statement that “education is the 
civil rights issue of our time.”313 Some see the Supreme Court’s 
more recent cases, such as Parents Involved in Community 
 
 305 Id. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. 
 308 Id. 
 309 Id. at 220. 
 310 REBELL, supra note 33, at 9. 
 311 Id. at 5. 
 312 See generally, Julio C. Gomez, A Child’s Civil Right to a Thorough and 
Efficient Education, 286 N.J. LAW. 65 (2014). 
 313 Nicole Cobler & Pete Stroud, In Speech, George W. Bush Says Education is 
Today’s Most Important Civil Rights Issue, THE DAILY TEXAN (Apr. 17, 2014, 8:51 PM), 
http://www.dailytexanonline.com/news/2014/04/10/in-speech-george-w-bush-says-
education-is-today%E2%80%99s-most-important-civil-rights-issue; Helene Cooper, 
Obama Takes Aim at Inequality in Education, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/07/us/politics/07obama.html?_r=0 (“Describing 
education and education equality as the ‘civil rights issue of our time,’ President 
Obama called Wednesday for a renewed effort to eliminate the achievement gap 
between African-American students and others.”); Kayleigh Skinner, Education Called 
Civil Rights Issue of Today, CLARION-LEDGER (June 26, 2014), 
http://www.clarionledger.com/story/news/2014/06/26/education-called-civil-rights-issue-
today/11445809/ (“‘Education is the civil rights [issue] of our time,’ McDonald said.”). 
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Schools v. Seattle School District,314 as an unfortunate retreat 
from the strong pro-educational stance it took with Brown and 
subsequent rulings.315 State courts have followed the Supreme 
Court’s withdrawal in their increasing unwillingness to hear 
education finance cases.316 Interestingly, the United States’ 
ranking in high school graduation rates relative to other 
countries has dropped in that time from first to twenty-first.317 
It takes a confident judge indeed to hold a legislature in 
contempt. That was, however, the exact solution necessary in 
the Brown desegregation era. It is equally necessary in the 
school finance dilemma the country faces today. Courts should 
therefore view this issue as urgently as other civil rights 
violations and use their contempt powers to halt them. 
D. Common Critiques and How Courts May Rebut Them 
Of course, the issue with comparing the instant case to the 
precedent described in the above sections is that none involve 
the exact separation of powers issue: a disagreement between 
co-equal branches of state government. They are all 
approximations. The federal government operates under its 
unique set of laws, so a federal court sanctioning federal 
executive officials does not provide an exact roadmap. 
Likewise, a federal court sanctioning local officials implicates 
the unequal federalist power structure. There is simply no 
precedent to make this an easy case. With the above reasons 
and arguments in mind, however, I urge state courts to use 
their full power to hold recalcitrant legislatures in contempt, 
and impose sanctions pursuant to that holding, for failing to 
comply with their constitutional duties. 
Critics of this position argue that allocating more money 
toward the school funding problem will not actually solve 
anything. Instead, critics say, schools need to learn to use the 
money they are given more wisely and frugally.318 Courts have 
no need, therefore, to get involved—let alone to sanction a 
legislature that they believe rightfully ignored the decree. As 
 
 314 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 315 REBELL, supra note 33, at 2. 
 316 Id. at 3. 
 317 Id. at 43. 
 318 Justin Owen et al., Education Funds Not Being Spent Wisely, THE BEACON 
CTR. OF TENN. (Sep. 4, 2013, 9:24 AM), http://www.beacontn.org/2013/09/education-
funds-not-being-spent-wisely/. 
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one court concluded, though, “[i]t is nothing more than an 
illusion to believe that the extensive disparity in financial 
resources does not relate directly to the quality of education.”319 
It is hard to imagine that the almost medieval state of Ohio 
schools in the 1990s, discussed above, could not have been 
brought to at least some minimum health and safety standards 
with money for a functioning heating system or fire alarms. 
One study found that “[i]nadequate education also dramatically 
raises crime rates and health costs, denies the nation 
substantial tax revenues, and raises serious questions about 
the civic competence of the next generation to function 
productively in a complex democratic society.”320 Courts can 
easily counter such monetary objections with the knowledge 
that this investment will yield greater monetary and societal 
returns. 
Another critique that surfaces frequently is a more populist 
separation of powers concern. A common sentiment is that only 
the voters and elected officials can exercise their voice to make 
education finance decisions.321 This could be because courts do 
not have sufficient resources to make proper decisions in this 
area, or because such decisions would be “judicial activism” 
taken too far. State judges are often elected too,322 however, so 
the importance of having a representative of the people to 
make decisions is already fulfilled. Further, courts are 
supposed to protect the rights of the minority, even if that is 
not a popular decision.323 The right to a certain level of basic 
education is specifically laid out in every state’s constitution.324 
The implications of restricting courts from enforcing their 
orders when dealing with a co-equal branch of government 
could be grim for voiceless minorities. As plaintiffs’ counsel in 
McCleary queried the court, “[w]hat is the purpose of 
separation of powers? Is it to protect government officials who 
violate the constitutional rights of citizens?”325 
 
 319 Washakie Cty. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 334 (Wyo. 1980). 
 320 REBELL, supra note 33, at 6. 
 321 See State AG’s Refresher on Separation of Powers Welcome, supra note 245. 
 322 Fact Sheet on Judicial Selection Methods in the States, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_sheet.authchec
kdam.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2016) (“[A] total of 38 states have some type of judicial 
elections.”). 
 323 Sandlow, supra note 216, at 1164. 
 324 Dayton & Dupre, supra note 46, at 2356 n.13. 
 325 Washington State Supreme Court, Oral Arguments: McCleary, et al. v. State 
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A related argument states that courts do not have the 
“power of the purse.”326 That power belongs to the legislature. 
Courts attempting to rule on education finance issues, and 
moreover enforce them, are overstepping that boundary. 
Admittedly, some courts have overreached.327 Multiple courts, 
however, have successfully refrained from telling the 
legislature how much money to spend.328 They left that up to 
the legislature, and let the representatives define the 
parameters by which it should be bound.329 In sum, the court 
simply tells the legislature that they are violating the 
constitution using boundaries the legislature set for itself.330 
Therefore, it is possible to stay within the proper bounds of 
judicial oversight and still enforce an order. 
E. Summary of Lessons Learned 
Based on the trials and successes of our exemplary 
education finance cases, and the analogous contempt 
proceedings throughout history, a few practical points can be 
gleaned. First, courts should not back down when 
constitutional violations of the state education clause are 
found. This likely means retaining jurisdiction of the case to 
ensure the order is followed. Second, courts must allow the 
legislature to define specific formulas and monetary amounts. 
Doing otherwise would mean overreaching into legislative 
functions. Allowing the party in violation to set their own rules 
also ensures less resistance when compliance is mandated. 
Third, courts should not afford legislatures too many 
chances. This was exemplified in the New Jersey saga.331 
Ordering a party to show cause, backed by the specter of 
contempt sanctions or school shutdown, may be more effective 
in the second or third rehearing than waiting until the seventh 
or eighth. The court will lose a lot of its perceived power so late 
in the case. Finally, a court must take into account the larger 
issues that may result from whatever sanctions it decides to 
 
of Washington, TVW.ORG, at 36:00 (Sep. 3, 2014), 
http://www.tvw.org/index.php?option=com_tvwplayer&eventID=2014090001. 
 326 See State AG’s Refresher on Separation of Powers Welcome, supra note 245. 
 327 See Part III.A. 
 328 See Part III.C. 
 329 See Part III.C. 
 330 See Part III.C. 
 331 See Part III.B. 
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impose. Shutting down schools in the middle of summer, as 
New Jersey did, may have little actual impact on students. 
Likewise, holding the legislature in contempt may be a 
sufficient scare tactic, with little actual negative impacts on the 
rest of society, to solve the problem. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The stories related above are those of conflicts that have 
happened time and time again. These separation of powers 
scuffles between branches of government are not new. From 
the Trail of Tears to the Little Rock Crisis, governing 
counterparts have tried to map out the boundaries of their 
constitutional duties and roles. While this battle has been seen 
throughout different legal areas, school finance litigation is one 
such area that seems to be caught in a never-ending cycle. 
Even if plaintiffs in these cases manage to win, a lack of 
legislative compliance with judicial orders is a significant 
roadblock to the desired outcomes. Courts’ deference to, or 
exhaustion with, this legislative inaction means that even 
novel litigation approaches or legal theories from the parties 
themselves have proven useless. The government must do its 
job to implement the remedies. That responsibility falls not 
only on the legislative and executive branches, but on the 
judicial branch as well. 
When presented with this issue, courts should not walk 
away from school finance cases. Courts have it within their 
power to enforce their orders and bring about finality to the 
dispute. That is a choice they must make, however. If “last 
resort” remedies are required, they should uphold students’ 
right to an adequate education under their state constitutions. 
Children are remarkably resilient in the face of adversity, but 
ensuring a safe, quality learning environment is paramount to 
developing an informed citizenry that can contribute to the 
world in which we all must live. As a noted education finance 
scholar said, “[t]here is broad consensus among business 
leaders, government officials, and educators that achieving 
both excellence and equity in this manner is critical to the 
nation’s future.”332 The time has come for state courts to join in 
 
 332 REBELL, supra note 33, at 5. 
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